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Abstract
Evaluating cyber security risk is a challenging task regardless of an organisation’s
nature of business or size, however, an essential activity. This paper uses the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) cyber security framework (CSF) to
assess the cyber security posture of a local government organisation in Western Aus-
tralia. Our approach enabled the quantification of risks for specific NIST CSF core
functions and respective categories and allowed making recommendations to address
the gaps discovered to attain the desired level of compliance. This has led the organi-
sation to strategically target areas related to their people, processes, and technologies,
thus mitigating current and future threats.
Keywords NIST cyber security framework · Local government · Cyber security ·
Risk assessment
1 Introduction
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cyber Security Frame-
work (CSF) [28] is a risk-based approach to manage risks organisations face from
a cyber security perspective. Similarly, several frameworks such as NIST SP 800-53
[27], COBIT5 [17], ISO/IEC 27001:2013 [23], ISA 62443-2-1:2009 [21], and ISA
62443-3-3:2013 [22] are being used to assess cyber security risk from different per-
spectives and outcomes are measured using different yardsticks. Often, navigating the
various frameworks can be challenging for organisations, especially if such expertise
are not present internally. Given the rapidly changing technology and threat landscape,
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assessing the cyber security posture of an organisation, regardless of their business or
size, is paramount.
Our focus of this paper is to demonstrate the application (Sect. 3) of NIST CSF in
a local government organisation and provide recommendations (Sect. 5) based on our
findings (Sect. 4).
The main contributions of this paper are:
– The adoption of the NIST CSF as an Assessment Tool and targeting different levels
of the organisation, depending on their level of expertise and job function to obtain
responses to facilitate assessment.
– Quantification of the assessment to reflect severity of actual risk, which in turn
enabled the organisation to effectively address the issues to attain desired level of
compliance.
– A detailed review of similar frameworks used in the industry and relevant case
studies (Sect. 6).
The next section provides a background of the NIST CSF and its components. We
recommend the reader to refer to NIST [28] for additional details and strategies for
suitable approaches to implement, which would vary from organisation to organisation.
2 The NIST CSF
The NIST CSF [28] consists of the Framework Core, the Framework Implementation
Tiers, and the Framework Profiles. The Framework Core consists of five concurrent and
continuous functions; Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover. We designed
an Assessment Tool for our investigation based on these functions, which provided
a systematic approach to ascertain the organisations cyber security risk management
practices and processes.
The Framework Implementation Tiers describe the level an organisations cyber
security risk management practices that comply with the framework. Tiers provide
context and degree to which cyber security risks are managed and extent to which busi-
ness needs are considered in cyber security risk management. The Assessment Tool
enabled the determination of the organisations Current Tier based on various inter-
nal and external factors such as their risk management practices, threat environment,
legal and regulatory requirements, business/mission objectives, and organisational
constraints. Organisations should also determine the Desired Tier, provided it is fea-
sible to implement, reduces cyber security risks, and meets the organisational goals.
The following are descriptions of the tier levels [28]:
– Tier-1 (Partial): risk management practices are not formalised and managed in an
ad hoc manner, lack awareness of cyber security risks organisation wide, and do
not have processes in place to collaborate with external entities.
– Tier-2 (Risk Informed): risk management practices are formalised but not inte-
grated organisation wide, but cyber security activities are prioritised based on
risks with adequate means to perform related duties, with informal means to com-
municate cyber security information internally and externally.
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– Tier-3 (Repeatable): risk management practices are formalised and policies are in
place and are adaptable to cyber threats. Organisation-wide approach is required
to manage cyber security with skilled and knowledgeable personnel to respond
and understand dependencies and role of external partners.
– Tier-4 (Adaptive): cyber security practices are based on lessons learnt and predic-
tive indicators, with continuous improvement, adaptability, and timely response.
Organisation-wide approach to manage cyber security risks is part of the organi-
sational culture and actively shares with external partners.
The Framework Profile represents the outcomes based on the business needs the
organisation characterised from the Framework Core and determined using the Assess-
ment Tool. Consequently, a Current Profile (the “as is” state) and a Target Profile (the
“to be” state) can be used to identify opportunities for improving the cyber security
of the organisation [28]. Framework profiles can be determined based on particular
implementation scenarios, and therefore, the gap between Current Profile and Target
Profile would vary as per scenario. In this paper, a local government-specific approach
to CSF was adapted. However, industry-specific tailoring may be performed for the
CSF.
3 Methodology
The NIST CSF allowed us to design an Assessment Tool targeted at three levels of
participants within the organisation, i.e. executive, management and technical. The
rationale was to ascertain organisation-wide understanding of cyber security risks.
Hence, the Assessment Tool comprised of questions addressing the requirements out-
lined as per the NIST CSF.
The questions were selected based on the nature and relevance to the level of
participant. This is because the NIST CSF comprised of questions that were both
technical and non-technical. Therefore, it would have been unrealistic to expect deep
knowledge of technical operations or implementation level details from a policy level
executive.
In order to assist us determine a baseline (i.e. the Desired Tier), additional questions
were included in the Assessment Tool to determine the nature of the organisation and
its business. This was then followed by the remaining requirements comprised in the
NIST CSF.
3.1 Determining compliance
The compliance for each measure was based on the responses provided by the partici-
pants. They were graded as either, Complaint, Partially Compliant, or Non-Compliant;
and each was assigned scores of either 10, 5, or 0, respectively, for each core function’s
subcategory. Any subcategory that was not applicable depending on the Desired Tier
level was excluded from the compliance score calculation.
Given the number of security requirements for each Core Function’s subcategory is
N, then the number of applicable requirements in each subcategory given the Desired
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Tier level is N ′. Therefore, the total compliance score C for each core function’s
category can be defined as:
C = Σ R
Σ N ′ × 10 (1)
where R is the compliance score for each category of the respective Core Function.
Additionally, a detailed document audit was conducted on existing policies and pro-
cedures. The Information Technology (IT) infrastructure (internal, remote locations,
and cloud) were reviewed, and a detailed internal vulnerability assessment was also
conducted during our investigation.
4 Findings
The responses provided by the Executive, Management, and Technical participants
gave insight into the organisation’s cyber security posture. Table 1 shows the summary
of the compliance of NIST CSF assessment. The compliance scores were determined
based on Eq. 1 presented previously.
For Identify core function, the organisation scored 36%. Their ability to track assets
centrally, keep management informed, and understand operational risks from a cyber
security perspective was limited, while a strategy to manage such risks did not exist.
However, the organisation understood its business well and were able set priorities to
support risk management decisions.
Access to physical/virtual assets were through authorisation and well-defined pro-
cesses. The staff were trained and informed adequately of information security related
duties and responsibilities. Certain aspects of data security related to confidential-
ity and availability were done reasonably well, however, assuring integrity of data
needed improvement. Similarly, local maintenance and remote maintenance of IT
infrastructure were carried out in a manner consistent to policies and procedures.
However, relevant policies, processes, and procedures, as well as technology to assist
the protection of information systems and relevant assets, were lacking. Therefore, in
aggregate, the organisation scored 45% compliance for Protect core function.
The organisation scored weakest in the detection of cyber security incidents with a
score of 25%. Although certain monitoring activities were in place to track physical
security and malicious code, timely detection of anomalous activities and detection
processes were lacking or non-existent.
Despite the lack of a specific response plan to respond to a cyber security events,
the organisation had measures in place to report incidents and coordinate activities
to respond adequately, which resulted in a 38% compliance score for Respond core
function. These practices are updated from time to time; however, mechanism to
perform post-incident analysis or to mitigate future cyber security events has not been
implemented presently.
Interestingly, the organisation was well prepared to deal with recovery and resump-
tion of core services after a cyber security event. The recovery plans in place are tested,
updated, and improved periodically, thus receiving full compliance for Recover core
functionality of the framework.
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Table 1 NIST CSF compliance matrix
Function Category Compliance (%) Total (%)
Identify (ID) Asset Management (ID.AM) 33 36
Business Environment (ID.BE) 75
Governance (ID.GV) 25
Risk Assessment (ID.RA) 25
Risk Management Strategy (ID.RM) 0
Protect (PR) Access Control (PR.AC) 60 45
Awareness and Training (PR.AT) 70
Data Security (PR.DS) 50
Information Protection Processes and
Procedures (PR.IP)
20
Maintenance (PR.MA) 75
Protective Technology (PR.PT) 38
Detect (DE) Anomalies and Events (DE.AE) 0 25
Security Continuous Monitoring (DE.CM) 43
Detection Processes (DE.DP) 25
Respond (RS) Response Planning (RS.RP) 0 38
Communications (RS.CO) 88
Analysis (RS.AN) 0
Mitigation (RS.MI) 0
Improvements (RS.IM) 100
Recover (RC) Recovery Planning (RC.RP) 100 100
Improvements (RC.IM) 100
Communications (RC.CO) 100
5 Recommendations
Based on the findings, the following recommendations were made with respect to each
core function of the NIST CSF.
5.1 Identify
(a) Establish a central inventory of assets, including physical devices and systems,
software, and external systems with all required information and prioritise based
on classification, criticality, and business value.
(b) Identify the organisations role in the supply chain (i.e. producer-consumer model)
as it captures and retains public data, collects revenue, and provides services to
its stakeholders.
(c) Establish an Information Security policy and reference relevant federal and state
policies regarding cyber security to ensure legal and regulatory requirements are
understood and managed.
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(d) Identify and prioritise threats and vulnerabilities, both internal and external, to
determine cyber security risks to the organisations operations, assets, and indi-
viduals.
(e) Establish risk management processes that are managed and agreed to by stake-
holders to support operational risk decisions.
5.2 Protect
(a) Strengthen the Access Control policy and procedures for organisation-wide assets
that require both physical and remote access.
(b) Sensitise and increase awareness about cyber security throughout the workforce
more comprehensively and provide adequate cyber security training based on
roles and responsibilities. In this regard, clearly describe cyber security roles and
responsibilities for relevant staff and external stakeholders.
(c) Enforce required provisions for data security in the policy and implement data-
at-rest and data-in-transit security, and integrity-checking mechanisms to ensure
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and data.
(d) Establish required policies, processes, and procedures to manage protection
of information assets. This include establishment of lacking policies and pro-
cesses, particularly for configuration management, data destruction, and physical
operating environment; identification of security baselines; SDLC for system
management; formulate vulnerability, response, and recovery plans.
(e) Strengthen processes that control and log remote access to organisational assets
by external maintenance contractors.
(f) Establish a central log of organisation-wide information systems and devices,
establish Removable Media policy, and strengthen network segregation to protect
communications and controls networks.
5.3 Detect
(a) Determine baselines for network operations and data flows, implement appropri-
ate activities to detect and analyse events based on event data aggregated from
multiple sources and sensors. Determine incident impact and threshold to prepare
and allocate resources appropriately.
(b) Implement tools to monitor cyber and physical environments to detect unautho-
rised mobile code, external service provider activities, and unauthorised access.
Perform organisation-wide vulnerabilities regularly.
(c) Outline detection requirements in Information Security policy and continuously
improve these processes to ensure timely and adequate awareness of anomalous
events.
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Fig. 1 Microsoft Power BI Internal Site for tracking, visualising, and reporting NIST CSF assessment
findings, courtesy of the participating local government organisation
5.4 Respond
(a) Establish processes and procedures to respond to cyber security events in a timely
manner.
(b) Define cyber security roles and responsibilities in Information Security policy to
ensure activities are coordinated for internal and external stakeholders including
law enforcement in response to cyber security events.
(c) Implement required cyber security events notification and detection systems to
ensure adequate information is available to analyse and understand the impact to
support recovery activities.
(d) Implement required cyber security controls to detect, report, and contain incidents
to prevent escalation of an incident, mitigate its effect, and eradicate the incidents.
Each of the above recommendations also had specific internal stakeholder(s) iden-
tified to indicate ownership and responsibility for addressing the issues associated.
Consequently, the organisation was then able to develop strategies to address the issues
identified, and assign specific tasks to individuals. For this purpose, the organisation
established an internal document using Microsoft Power BI [25] (typically referred
to as a Power BI site) to track and visualise the status of the NIST CSF assessment
(Fig. 1).
The Power BI site facilitated transparency, visibility, and central reporting through-
out the organisation. Intuitively, this resulted in a rapid and responsive drive for the
organisation to address and prioritise issues based on severity and cost, with the goal
of achieving Tier-2 compliance.
Furthermore, a desire to achieve a higher compliance level such as Tier-3 was
expressed. Such aspiration is encouraged, however, with caution. Even though a higher
level of compliance will improve the cyber security posture of the organisation, it will
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also affect other aspects such as resources and cost. For example, when contrasting
the Risk Management Process between Tier-2 and Tier-3 as defined in the NIST CSF
[28]:
(a) Implementation of risk management practices are not mandatory in Tier-2,
whereas these have to be implemented as organisation-wide policies in Tier-3.
Thus, Tier-3 organisations should have procedures, processes, technology, and
human resources to implement relevant policies.
(b) The cyber security activities’ priorities are updated in a passive nature in Tier-2
as opposed to regular active updates and constant re-evaluation of priorities for
Tier-3 compliance. To acquire such capability, an organisation requires adequate
technology, skilled human resources, and relevant policies that would enable
keeping pace with the changes in the technology and threat landscape.
In addition to the two points highlighted above, considering both Integrated
Risk Management Program and External Participation [28], significant investment
in resources and human skills development or acquisition is needed to make the tran-
sition from Tier-2 to Tier-3. Moreover, this should only be considered carefully based
on the organisation’s business requirements, strategic objectives, budget, risk appetite,
and current and future threats.
6 Related frameworks
The diversity and complexity of Information Technology (IT) system components
have increased significantly in recent years. Consequently, in order for businesses to
adequately secure these systems, several standards and frameworks have been devel-
oped [2]. Such frameworks need to be applicable to all manner of business sectors,
be they government or private, enterprise or small-business. Tables 2 and 3 provide a
summary of useful examples of how both NIST SP 800-53 and ISO/IEC 27001:2013
frameworks have been applied in practice.
Since NIST CSF can be considered as a high-level abstraction of related frame-
works, it provides references to other related frameworks for specific implementation
guidelines. These referenced frameworks include:
– NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4.
– Control Objectives for Information and Related Technologies (COBIT5).
– ISO/IEC 27001:2013.
– ISA 62443-2-1:2009.
– ISA 62443-3-3:2013.
These are further described below.
6.1 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4
NIST SP 800-53 [27] revisions are made according to changes in responsibilities
under the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), Public Law (P.L.)
107-347. The latest version of this framework consists of five functions (Identify,
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Table 2 Summary of case studies for NIST SP 800-53
Case study Description
Maroochy water services cyber
attack against critical infrastructure
in 2000 [1]
Disgruntled former employee used insider knowledge, stolen
configuration and equipments to release more than one
million litres of untreated sewerage water resulting in
considerable environmental damage and prosecution by the
Environmental Protection Agency. The case study revealed
that the application of CSF controls would have mitigated the
cyber attack
Intel’s high-risk IT business units’
pilot project [11]
Intel IT’s Office and Enterprise business units, considered to be
high-level risk environments, were the testbed for a pilot
project to test the effectiveness of the NIST SP 800-53. The
benefits of using this framework were realised within a short
timeframe, with coherent use of risk management
technologies across the business model, improved
identification of strengths and weaknesses, and more efficient
assessments of security priorities. As a result of the pilot
project, Intel IT planned to expand the framework’s
implementation throughout their business infrastructure
Cyber security framework
implementation at the University of
Chicago [32]
The University of Chicago used the framework to establish
cyber security protection for Biological Services Division
(BSD). The four-part implementation consisted of identifying
the initial state of cyber security processes, assessment of the
initial threat landscape, determination of the desired target
status, and a roadmap to establish and monitor progress. This
resulted in better identification of security requirements and
target objectives, develop and maintain departmental
processes to achieve these objectives, provide long-term
security solutions in a cost-effective manner, and improve
information-sharing and good work practices across
departments with different cyber security requirements
How the University of Pittsburgh is
using the NIST cyber security
framework [31]
The University of Pittsburgh used the NIST SP 800-53 to
implement an IT security package that would cater for
diversified needs while enabling collaboration between
different departments, accommodate a wide variety of
information types and sensitivities, and encompass third-party
contractors on an ad hoc basis. NIST SP 800-53 enabled these
goals to be met through the streamlining of existing practices
and improving documentation. The scalable nature of NIST
CSF was applicable to the differing scope and IT
requirements of each department within the University
SIEM-based framework for security
controls automation [26]
The potential of using SIEM technology is investigated with the
aim of maximising security-control automation. For the
security controls identified in NIST SP 800-53,
approximately 30% of these controls were considered as
having the capability of automation control. The cost of
implementing a SIEM-based framework for security-control
automation would be quickly recouped within a short time
compared to the reduced employee-hours required to monitor
an infrastructure the size of a local government organisation
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Table 2 continued
Case study Description
Recommendations for information
security awareness training for
college students [24]
A survey largely based on NIST SP 800-50 was designed to
assess information security awareness amongst students at the
business college of a mid-sized University in New England.
The survey found that less than one-quarter of the participants
had undertaken any form of Information Security Awareness
Training (ISAT), and only two of the 68 had enrolled in
University-provided training. ISAT of employees in local
government is an integral part of a well-implemented cyber
security infrastructure. Any cyber security review needs to
ascertain current levels of information security awareness to
gauge whether existing training is effective or deficient. The
training needs to be regularly updated as new vulnerabilities
and threats continually develop in this field
Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover), 22 categories, and 98 subcategories. This
framework utilises a four-tier security model (Partial, Risk Informed, Repeatable, and
Adaptive) and a seven-step process (Prioritise and Scope, Orient, Create a Current
Profile, Conduct a Risk Assessment, Create a Target Profile, Determine, Analyse
and Prioritise Gaps, and Implement Action Plan). It focuses on assessing the current
situation by determining how to assess security, how to consider risk, and how to
resolve the security threats.
6.2 Control Objectives for Information and Related Technologies (COBIT5)
COBIT5 [17] is a business CSF designed for the governance and maintenance of
enterprise IT systems. It consists of five domains and 37 processes in line with the
responsibility areas of plan, build, run, and monitor. COBIT5 is aligned and coordi-
nated with other recognised IT standards and good practices, such as NIST, ISO 27000,
COSO, ITIL, BiSL, CMMI, TOGAF and PMBOK. It is built around the following
considerations:
– The need to meet stakeholder expectations.
– The end-to-end process control of the enterprise.
– To work as a single integrated framework.
– Recognising that “Management” and “Governance” are two different things.
6.3 ISO/IEC 27001:2013
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 [23] is an international information security standard published
by the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) and the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), which originated from the British Standard, BS
7799. This framework consists of 114 controls in 14 groups describing the require-
ments needed to design and implement an Information Security Management Systems
(ISMS). Version 2 released in 2013 replaces the 2005 version 1 edition. It is a standard
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Table 3 Summary of case studies for ISO 27001:2013
Case study Description
Thames Security Shredding (TSS)
Ltd. [3]
TSS specialises in the collection and destruction of confidential
documentation on a commercial scale. Maintaining information
security is, therefore, a critical process to protect their clients’
identity and to ensure compliance with the UK Data Protection
Act 1998. Certification to the ISO/IEC 27001 standard was seen
as an integral part of the implementation and maintenance of
world-class customer-centric security controls that would satisfy
existing and prospective customers’ needs and allow for rapid
growth in the business. ISO/IEC 27001 certification resulted in an
improved attitude and awareness of their staff towards
information-security-related issues. A risk-based business
continuity plan was used to minimise the impact of any potential
security breaches. The certification allowed documentation to be
continually updated and improved as corrective actions were
taken
Fredrickson International [4] Debt collection is a sector which, like banking, finance,
telecommunications, and local government, is coming under
increasing scrutiny and regulation. Fredrickson International is a
debt collection agency who lists a central government
department, and several UK financial institutions and FTSE 100
companies amongst their clients. Since attaining ISO/IEC 27001
certification, Fredrickson has achieved higher levels of security
awareness throughout its departments, staff, and employees.
Security audits have become more streamlined, and customers
were given the confidence that Fredrickson was conducting
international best practice when it came to information security
Legal Ombudsman [5] The office of the Legal Ombudsman for England and Wales was
established to simplify the process by which members of the
public, small businesses, charities, clubs, trusts, etc., could
resolve complaints about legal practitioners. To improve its
customer service, information security practices conducted by the
office needed to show that greater information security awareness
had been established, diligence and compliance in handling
sensitive information were in place, and that an assurance
framework was aligned with global best practice. ISO/IEC 27001
certification helped the Legal Ombudsman for England and Wales
to provide clients with the confidence and reassurance that it was
conducting its work by the highest work standards. A better
understanding of the information security among its staff led to a
reduction in risk and an increase in productivity
SVM Cards Europe [7] SVM is a leading provider of gift card, voucher, e-code, reward
code, and similar promotional and benefit schemes throughout
Europe. SVM required secure business processes, improved
internal organisation, increased information protection, and
sought greater tender and competitive advantage. With ISO/IEC
27001 certification, SVM observed that processes became more
of a lifestyle than strictly about security only, which resulted in
less downtime, instigated a stronger organisational structure,
improved on its ability to win new contracts, and have greater
confidence that their information security processes were
working properly
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Table 3 continued
Case study Description
InfoView Technologies [6] InfoView Technologies, a Queensland-based data analytics
company, required a business model that met state government
requirements, improved data security understanding, became
more professional, improved its business culture, and be able to
sustain and continuously improve its information security
management, systems, and policies. These goals were achieved
through ISO/IEC 27001 accreditation, after which InfoView
Technologies were able to gain increased market access, meet
compliance requirements of the Queensland state government,
reduce risk, become more competitive, and streamline its
practices and business culture
Capgemini [8] Capgemini is the largest IT services company in Europe; and a
global leader in its multiple domains of services. Operating in
more than 40 countries, and over 100 languages, Capgemini’s
business model needed to transcend national and cultural
boundaries. Systems were required to be robust to avoid losing
business and maintain competitiveness. Protection of client assets
and resources was deemed a priority to assure confidentiality,
integrity, and availability. Through ISO/IEC 27001 certification,
Capgemini was able to ensure improved security within its
departments and for its clients, enhance security awareness in its
staff and employees, and provide more efficient and streamlined
documentation and reporting procedures. Standards certification
needed to be applicable within the global marketplace, and
remain pertinent regardless of cultural differences
Costain [9] Costain, a UK-based engineering and construction group, has
contributed to the construction of significant projects worldwide.
Obtaining standards certifications was seen as the correct path to
achieve improvements in several internal processes. Such goals
required the implementation of several standards, such as quality
management standard (ISO 9001), environmental management
(ISO 14001), health and safety (BS OHSAS 18001), collaborative
business relationships (BS 11000), information security
management (ISO/IEC 27001) and business continuity
management (ISO 22301). Through the enactment of multiple
standards, Costain was able to improve several areas of their
business to the benefit of their internal and external customers
that should be instigated by all businesses where information security is a critical factor,
but in particular, applies to software development, managed service providers/hosting
services providers, IT, banking and insurance, information management, government
agencies and their service providers, and E-commerce merchants [23].
6.4 ISA 62443-2-1:2009
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 [21] is an International Standards on Auditing (ISA) standard
covering the elements required to develop an Industrial Automation Control System
Security Management System (IACS-SMS). It consists of three categories, three ele-
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ment groups, and 22 elements. The framework is the first of four ISA policy and
procedure products that identifies the essentials necessary to establish an effective
cyber security management system (CSMS). However, the step-by-step approach as
to how this is achieved is company-specific and according to their own business culture.
These essentials are:
– Risk analysis.
– Addressing risk with the CSMS.
– Monitoring and improving the CSMS.
6.5 ISA 62443-3-3:2013
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 [22] is an International Standards on Auditing (ISA) standard
covering the elements required for cyber security controls of industrial control systems
(ICS). It consists of seven Foundation Requirements and 51 System Requirements.
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 is the third of three ISA systems products, that outlines system
security requirements and security levels [22].
6.6 Other frameworks
In addition to the above, other frameworks used in the industry include:
– Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) is
an enterprise risk management standard, designed jointly by five leading associa-
tions, with the aim of integrating strategy and performance [13].
– Council on CyberSecurity Top 20 Critical Security Controls (CCS CSC) consists of
a prioritised set of actions, originally developed by the SANS Institute, to protect
assets from cyber attack [12].
– ISF Standard of Good Practice (SoGP) is a standard aimed at providing controls
and guidance on all aspects of information security [20].
– ETSI Cyber Security Technical Committee (TC Cyber) was developed to improve
standards within the European telecommunications sector [15].
– Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture (SABSA) Enhanced NIST Cyber-
security (SENC) project enhances the five core levels of the NIST CSF into a
SABSA model consisting of a six-level security architecture [30].
– IASME Consortium (IASME) is an information assurance standard based on ISO
27000, but aimed at small businesses [18].
– RFC 2196 - Site Security Handbook (SSH) represents a guide on how to develop
computer security policies and procedures [19].
– Health Information Trust Alliance (HITRUST) is the first IT security CSF designed
specifically for the healthcare sector. It is based on existing NIST standards and is
aimed at healthcare and information security professionals [16].
– North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protec-
tion (NERC-CIP) version 5 is a set of requirements needed to secure the assets of
the North American bulk electric system [14].
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– Open Security Architecture (OSA) is a free community-owned resource of advice
on the selection, design, and integration of devices required to provide security
and control of an IT network [29].
– Good Practice Guide 13 (GPG13) is a UK government CSF related to Code of
Connection (CoCo) compliance for businesses to secure IT systems [10].
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have used the NIST CSF to evaluate the cyber security risks of a local
government organisation in Western Australia. Our approach can be used to derive
measurable metrics for each Framework Core function and respective categories, thus
enabling the organisation to ascertain the cyber security preparedness to actual risk.
Our findings suggest that evaluating the Desired Tier compliance to the NIST CSF
helps identify the specific people, process, and technology areas that require improve-
ment (i.e. gaps), which directly influence threat mitigation. The application of CSF
helped us understand the current security context of the organisation while identifying
the risks and future growth areas to improve. While higher tier compliance maybe
desired, we have also recommended that the organisation’s business requirements,
strategic goals, budget, risk appetite, and current and future threats to be considered
carefully.
Furthermore, as we have presented several related frameworks, navigating such
frameworks for self assessment can be challenging, often not intended by design even,
but not impossible. We have observed that the NIST CSF offers an advantage over
other frameworks in this regard. However, there is still room for developing additional
tools that would simplify the implementation process and speed up adoption.
Therefore, our future work will aim to improve the current Assessment Tool we
have used, with a focus of making it adaptable and accessible to a wider audience and
measurable for accurate quantification of cyber preparedness.
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